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A moral paradigm shift has proposed for participation in health-related research. It’s not just a 
praiseworthy option, some say; it’s a social obligation. Recasting research participation in this way 
would have global ramifications, however. Who ultimately stands to gain the most from it, and 
who has the most to lose?
Over the past few years, a growing number of people have called for reconceptualizing 
participation in health research as a moral obligation. John Harris argues that seriously 
debilitating diseases give rise to important needs, and since medical research is necessary to 
relieve those needs in many circumstances, people are morally obligated to act as research 
subjects.1 Rosamond Rhodes claims that research participation is a moral obligation for 
reasons of justice, beneficence, and self-development: because we all benefit significantly 
from modern medicine, we are all required to do our part in advancing the state of medical 
knowledge.2 Individuals who reap the benefits of medical knowledge without contributing 
through research participation are not only acting unfairly toward others, but acting against 
their own self-interest. G. Owen Schaefer and colleagues argue that “because the enterprise 
of biomedical research produces the important benefit of medical knowledge that is an 
advantage to all, every individual has an obligation to support that system of knowledge 
generation by participating in biomedical research.”3 For this reason, they write, individuals 
normally ought to participate in clinical trials when presented with the option.
At the same time, such claims come with some important qualifications. Like most 
obligations, the moral obligation to participate in research is prima facie or not absolute; it 
may be legitimately overridden in particular cases by other important concerns. Moreover, 
there is no moral obligation to participate in research when, for example, the potential risks 
to the individual far outweigh the expected benefits, when a study is poorly designed, or 
when the research has not been reviewed by a (competent) ethics committee. However, for 
those who advocate this view, the crux is that there is a moral obligation to participate in 
biomedical research. For once the moral obligation exists, the burden of proof shifts: instead 
of individuals needing good reasons to sign up for research studies, they should participate 
in research unless they have good reasons not to.
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Conceiving research participation as morally obligatory conflicts with the commonly held 
view that agreeing to join a research study is morally praiseworthy, recommended, or 
supererogatory. The idea that research participation is valuable but not obligatory is 
expressed (implicitly or explicitly) in many influential research ethics guidelines and 
regulations, embodied in current research practices, and defended in influential discussions 
about the ethics of research involving human subjects. Recasting research participation as 
obligatory is therefore not a minor philosophical quibble about the moral status of an action. 
Viewing research participation in this way would constitute an ethical paradigm shift with 
global ramifications, analogous to other efforts to promote particular religious or secular 
moral views around the world.
Some preliminaries are in order. By research participation, I mean individuals agreeing to 
be research subjects and following relevant protocol procedures. One could broadly 
understand “participation” as contributing to the practice of research in general, including 
tax contributions. However, ways of contributing to research other than volunteering to be a 
research subject are not the focus of this paper because the heart of the ethical discussion is 
about the more controversial issue of individual research participation, not about general 
research support. By moral obligation, I mean the following: if an action is morally 
obligatory for a person, then that person is the appropriate object of negative moral attitudes 
(such as blame) if he or she fails to perform that action, unless he or she has a legitimate 
excuse. This definition of (prima facie) moral obligation is fairly standard and distinct from 
acts that are morally permissible. There is no blame-worthiness attached to the failure to 
perform morally permissible actions, though other disapproving attitudes may be warranted. 
By health-related research, I mean research that is performed on human subjects and in 
which the ultimate goal is to improve the health of individuals and populations. I use the 
term this way, rather than to refer to any research involving human subjects, because it 
illustrates the strongest case for research being obligatory. I describe the research as “health-
related” (rather than as “biomedical”) to avoid the impression that the debate is exclusively 
about participation in clinical trials. Other kinds of health research can also contribute to 
significant health improvements. This paper focuses on participation in health-related 
research as a moral obligation in the above-defined terms.
I also want to distinguish two ways of conceiving research participation as a moral 
obligation. According to a general conception, participation in health-related research is 
prima facie morally obligatory. Individuals have a standing moral obligation to participate in 
health-related research unless they have strong reasons not to do so. According to a 
particular conception, some health-related research is morally obligatory, but some is not. 
According to the latter view, the moral status of research participation is not uniform; 
instead, it is determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on variables such as the 
condition studied, the type of research, or special features of prospective participants. This 
paper largely focuses on the general conception, as this is the central focus of the current 
debate, though I will suggest the particular conception may ultimately be more defensible.
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Arguing for Research Participation as Moral Obligation
Surveying the existing literature, there are three key arguments in favor of the general claim: 
the rescue argument, the free-rider argument, and the public good argument.4 I will briefly 
describe the core claims of these arguments and their strengths before analyzing some 
shared underlying weaknesses.
According to the rescue argument, our obligation to participate in health-related research 
follows from a more basic obligation to prevent harm to persons. Health-related research has 
developed products (for instance, antibiotics and surgical advances) that have prevented or 
treated serious harms. Many people would be much worse off if health-related research had 
not taken place in the past. People who fail to participate in health-related research fail to 
prevent these harms, and if they have no legitimate excuse for not participating, then they 
are blameworthy.
According to the free-rider argument, if we have benefited from health-related research in 
which others have participated as subjects, then we have a moral obligation to do likewise. 
A glance at our medicine cabinets reveals that we all benefit from health-related research, in 
one way or another, and human subjects’ past participation in research has helped make 
these benefits possible. Individuals who enjoy the fruits of research without bearing the 
burdens of research participation are therefore blameworthy. Here, blameworthiness consists 
in unfairness rather than failure to prevent harm.
According to the public good argument, individuals have a moral obligation to participate in 
health-related research because the knowledge and products developed through this research 
are public goods—a valuable resource of advantages and benefits that can be shared among 
present and future generations. Analogies are often employed in support of the argument. 
For example, clean air and democratic institutions are public goods, and therefore, people 
have a moral obligation not to drive cars that produce a lot of pollution and to participate in 
the democratic process by voting. According to this view, those who fail to contribute to 
public goods without a valid excuse are blameworthy. What makes failure to participate in 
research blameworthy here is neither harm nor justice, but civic responsibility and broad 
self-interest. Citizens ought to care about the benefits of health-related research for present 
and future generations, just as they should care about other public goods.
These three arguments can be put forward simultaneously. One could claim that those who 
do not participate in health-related research are indifferent to the suffering of future persons, 
unjustly benefit from sacrifices made by past research participants, and neglect 
responsibilities to the society that their descendents will inherit and from which they have 
gained significant advantages. The power and attraction of the arguments—either singularly 
in combination—derive from the important moral values they appeal to: prevention of harm, 
justice, and social responsibility.
Unresolved Issues
However, these arguments are diluted by a number of unresolved issues that those who 
believe research participation is an obligation have not adequately addressed. One 
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unresolved issue is philosophical: when are reasons in favor of an action strong enough to 
make that action morally obligatory? Typically, there are some moral (and practical) reasons 
to act and some moral (and practical) reasons not to act, or that favor a different action. 
Moral reasons in favor of an action are necessary, but not sufficient, to make that action 
morally obligatory. What is required for an action to be judged morally obligatory, rather 
than merely morally praiseworthy or worth encouraging from a moral point of view? One 
might intuitively think that the reasons in favor of the action must be especially strong or 
compelling. But even strong moral reasons in favor of an action do not necessarily make it 
obligatory.
For example, one may have very good reasons to volunteer to help homeless people after 
work rather than going to the gym, and while doing the former may be worth encouraging, it 
is not obvious that choosing the latter is necessarily blameworthy.5 So what extra is needed? 
On some accounts, for an action to be morally obligatory, there must not only be good moral 
reasons in favor of that action, but existing social expectations supporting those reasons and 
giving them force. As Susan Wolf argues, we may have good moral reasons to volunteer at a 
rape crisis center (rather than go to the gym), avoid eating all animal products, or 
scrupulously avoid using the male pronoun to refer inclusively to men and women, but there 
are not (or not yet) sufficiently strong social expectations to unambiguously justify 
attributions of moral obligation and blameworthiness in such cases.6 Research participation 
may not currently have the network of social expectations necessary to give it the force and 
authority of a moral obligation, despite whatever virtues the rescue, free-rider, and public 
goods arguments may have.7 What makes an action obligatory—and failing to perform it 
blameworthy—is a matter of continuing philosophical debate. My point here is that 
proponents of the view that research participation is obligatory have generally assumed, 
without argument, that the reasons they offer are sufficient to constitute a moral obligation.
A common objection to the rescue, free-rider, and public goods arguments concerns 
alternative contributions to biomedical research. Let us assume that research participation is 
a moral obligation. It is possible to avoid being a free rider, to help prevent future harm to 
patients, and to contribute to the public good of health—to fulfill one’s obligations, in other 
words—without personally becoming a research subject. One could, for instance, donate to a 
research wing of a medical hospital, offer a scholarship for young health researchers, or 
contribute to health-related research by paying taxes. And, of course, one is usually not a 
“free rider” in a literal sense because one pays for the benefits of health-related research, 
either directly or through insurance premiums.8 Proponents of the general conception must 
demonstrate that, to obtain the goods connected to health-related research, research 
participation is required in addition to these other possible contributions.
But that is not all. If there were enough (or a surplus) of research participants, the case for 
research participation as a moral obligation would be as weak as moral appeals for blood 
transfusion volunteers when there is (and will be) no blood shortage. So the argument that 
research participation is obligatory partly rests on a utilitarian assumption: if more people 
volunteered for research, there would be more discoveries, leading to greater social benefits. 
Health-related research ought to be expanded as far as possible to maximize potential 
benefits, in which case there will never be enough research participants. Proponents of the 
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general conception rarely argue explicitly in support of this “maximizing” utilitarian 
assumption, nor do they dwell on its implications.
The validity of the above assumption partly depends on empirical facts about how health-
related research is actually conducted and implemented. The arguments that research 
participation is a moral obligation—particularly the public good argument—are compelling 
to the extent that health-related research does in reality what it ideally is supposed to be 
doing: target important health needs and priorities and facilitate the implementation of 
successful research interventions into clinical and public health practice, thereby 
contributing significantly to improved population health.
All too often, however, reality sharply diverges from the ideal. For example, some health-
related research— and particularly some pharmaceutical research—is not geared toward 
reducing significant morbidity and mortality in vast numbers, and its choices of research 
questions and investments may serve corporate interests rather than (or at the expense of) 
public interests. Research priorities do not match up with global health needs: the vast 
majority of the world’s health research expenditures are focused on diseases and conditions 
that affect only a small minority of its population.9 When health research studies are 
increasingly devoted to the development of “me-too” drugs or treatments for minor (but 
marketable) ailments, we may begin to doubt the goal of maximizing health research in 
general and have suspicions about calls for ever more research participants. Such suspicions 
can be deepened by studies showing that industry-funded research tends to produce 
outcomes favorable to the research sponsor10 or by cases where the results of unfavorable 
studies are concealed from doctors and patients.11
Another way of questioning the idea of research participation as a moral obligation involves 
the issue of health care access. In the United States, millions of uninsured or underinsured 
patients have no or limited access to many of the fruits of biomedical research. In 
developing countries, millions continue to suffer from diseases and conditions for which 
effective treatments or preventive methods were discovered by researchers decades ago. Do 
people have an obligation to participate in health-related research when there are serious 
gaps between the research and public access to successful health interventions? One could 
argue (following Rosamond Rhodes) that the injustice of limited health care access is 
irrelevant to the question of whether health research participation is obligatory; one should 
work to increase health care access while continuing vigorously to promote participation in 
health-related research, including research among marginalized populations. 12 But 
questions of access and obligation are not unrelated. Arguments that research participation is 
obligatory are premised on successful research products being accessible public goods, and 
to the extent that this is not the case, the argument is weakened.
Alternatively, one could (following Schaefer and colleagues) stipulate that there is no prima 
facie duty for an individual to participate in research if inequities preclude that individual 
from receiving the benefits of research.13 But restricted access to research benefits should be 
a concern for everyone and should impact the moral status of research participation 
generally. Why should it be obligatory for me to participate in research only if I personally 
stand to gain from it, while many others will not have access to the potential benefits? 
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Again, the argument for moral obligation rests on the assumption that biomedical research is 
likely to produce publicly accessible health benefits, not just benefits to the participant, and 
chronic problems with health care access erode this assumption. To state the point more 
broadly: for participation to be obligatory, the research has to be important. It is 
unreasonable to blame people for not joining studies whose value is minor, ambiguous, or 
dubious.
Establishing criteria for determining the “importance” of health-related research is no easy 
task: should we understand it in terms of health indicators and outcomes or in terms of other 
measures, and if so, which ones? Those who see research as a moral obligation tend to 
sidestep the question of importance, relying largely on an intuition that biomedical research 
is important as a whole and selectively using famous examples of successful research (such 
as development of the polio vaccine and antibiotics) to support this intuition. Sociological 
data on what kinds of research are actually conducted and the political economy of how 
research priorities are made and how studies get funded not only reveals a mixed, less heroic 
picture, but also weakens the case that research participation is a moral obligation.
There is another, related question about the importance of health-related research. However 
this importance is understood, it is bound to take into account avoidable morbidity and 
mortality. But morbidity and mortality can be (and often are) positively affected by factors 
other than healthrelated research. The incidence of tuberculosis fell sharply due to 
improvements in housing conditions and hygiene before the discovery of the tubercle 
bacillus in 1882 and the discovery of Streptomycin in 1943. On a social determinants of 
health model, health-related research is just one determinant of good health among many.14 
Health is often more effectively improved by attending to known causes of poor health—
like poverty—than by conducting or joining health research studies, whose future impact on 
health is uncertain.15 Showing the relative importance of health-related research—either by 
comparing it to other ways of improving health or by exposing the less reputable aspects of 
contemporary health research—dilutes the case for regarding research participation as a 
moral obligation.
Global Implications
What might change, in practical terms, if research participation came to be regarded as 
morally obligatory? If the practical consequences were quite negative, these would 
constitute additional reasons not to change the current moral status of research participation. 
Those who defend such a change need to demonstrate that such negative consequences are 
unlikely, or that there are counterbalancing positive consequences that allow the overall 
benefits to outweigh the costs. They must also take into account the impact this change is 
likely to have among vulnerable populations in low-income countries whose only access to 
adequate health care may come from participating in research, since these countries are 
increasingly where health-related research takes place.16 Three potential areas of concern, if 
research is considered morally obligatory, are informed consent, participant recruitment, and 
the ethical review of research.
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If health-related research is morally obligatory, is participation a genuine choice? Does it 
still make sense to ask for consent when research is a duty? In principle, obligation is 
compatible with choice. If I have a moral obligation to repay a debt, I can still choose not to 
repay and face the consequences. Similarly, if I have a moral obligation to participate in 
research, I can choose to decline. In both cases, however, my freedom is restricted in the 
sense that blame attaches to a failure to do the obligatory. If someone expresses reluctance 
to join a study, researchers would be justified in using powers of persuasion—short of 
coercion—to gain agreement. One downside is that people may chose to enter studies to 
avoid being regarded as blameworthy by health authorities, rather than basing agreement on 
their understanding of study benefits and risks.
Recruitment and retention
Schaefer and colleagues approvingly state that calling research participation morally 
obligatory would change how studies are advertised and potential participants recruited. 
Research advertisements could be similar to voting initiatives, morally exhorting the public 
to “do its part,” and researchers could be allowed to recruit more aggressively, since they 
would, in effect, be helping people to do their duty.17 Would it still be appropriate (as is now 
commonly part of the consent process) to tell participants that they can leave a study at any 
time, for any reason, and without penalty? Schaefer et al. do not say, but it is inconsistent to 
frame research participation as a moral obligation on the one hand, and on the other hand, to 
tell participants they are simply free to leave a study. It would be more consistent to use 
persuasion—again, short of coercion—to keep participants in a study. One way of doing this 
would be to label departure from a study as being unethical or wrong.18 In a similar spirit, 
some contract research organizations and other for-profit research organizations currently 
employ “hard refusal” recruitment techniques. This involves repeatedly contacting 
prospective participants by phone, email, and correspondence until the person 
unambiguously states that he or she does not want to participate. Such proactive recruitment 
practices—borrowed from marketing research—acquire a moral justification if research 
participation is framed as an obligation and could become the rule rather than the exception.
Role of ethics review
How might the ethics review of research change if research participation was understood as 
a moral obligation? According to some, as long as review boards function well and ensure 
that individuals do not participate in excessively burdensome studies (in other words, those 
where burdens outweigh benefits), then research participants are adequately protected.19 
However, we have some reason to believe that ethics committees would indeed review 
studies differently, grounded in the notion of “benefit” and the dynamics of the weighing of 
benefits and risks. When research participation is seen as morally obligatory, the focus of 
attention would be drawn more to the social benefits of research than to benefits for 
individual participants. Ethics committees would likely concern themselves to a greater 
extent with the likelihood and magnitude of the health-related public good that a study might 
produce.
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This is not to say that burdens and risks to participants would not enter into consideration, or 
that highly risky studies would be considered acceptable as long as the social benefits were 
sufficiently great. What it could entail is an overall higher tolerance for risk to research 
subjects, now that social benefits are being weighed against risks to individuals who are 
morally obligated to participate. Or, to put it another way: if health-related research is so 
important that participation becomes a moral obligation, why shouldn’t participants be 
subjected to more risks? We permit other people—like soldiers, policemen, and firefighters
—to face heightened risks when fulfilling their crucial social duties and protecting other 
public goods. It seems to follow that ethics committees would be less risk-averse in their 
reviews under this new dispensation, for the same reasons that they would allow for more 
aggressive recruitment and retention methods and permit researchers to engage robustly in 
moral persuasion.
Viewing research participation as morally obligatory would clearly provide researchers with 
powerful new tools: they could appeal to a prospective participant’s sense of duty (or guilt) 
and employ a wide range of persuasive means to draw people into research studies. Calling 
research participation obligatory would also help researchers retain subjects by shifting the 
burden of providing justification onto participants who no longer wish to continue. Ethics 
committees would facilitate the process of increasing the numbers of research participants 
by approving studies with a higher level of risk than they might otherwise accept.
One nagging question, however, is whether making research participation obligatory goes 
hand in hand with the disempowerment of research participants, particularly the poor, 
illiterate, and marginalized. How can one say that a street vendor in India, a sheet metal 
worker in Poland, or a housewife in rural Uganda has a moral obligation to participate in 
(largely externally funded and led) health-related research, particularly if their community 
may not enjoy the social benefits of the research? Research increasingly takes place across 
vast inequalities among funding agencies, researchers, research institutions and companies, 
host countries, participants, and communities. One might argue that a moral obligation exists 
in such cases if participants and communities will gain benefits down the road20 or if during 
the research, there is a fair exchange of some valued benefits among researchers, 
participants, and communities.21 But with the inequalities that currently affect the world, the 
lion’s share of research benefits (in terms of researcher prestige and livelihood, capacity-
building, patents, drug development, health improvements, or profits) tend to flow to those 
already better-off, and health-related benefits from research may not be integrated into 
developing countries’ local health systems even decades later.22 Given this, in addition to 
other possible practical implications noted above, do we really want to call research 
participation morally obligatory?
Let us consider two possible counterarguments. First, imagine the following scenario. A 
research study in Uganda is directed at a health condition that afflicts many Ugandans. In 
addition to benefits that study participants will receive (such as free diagnostics and other 
ancillary health care benefits), the study funders have agreed to provide benefits to the local 
community in the form of, say, building a new health clinic. In this case, would it be 
inappropriate to claim that participation of individual community members (who pass the 
inclusion criteria) is morally obligatory, and that if they do not join, they would be doing 
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something morally wrong? There are a number of complex issues at play here. One could 
possibly make a case for moral obligation if one assumes several things—that the health 
condition studied trumps other important health priorities in the country, that this study in 
particular is very important in tackling that condition, and that the clinic will save a 
significant number of lives. However, this is not an argument for regarding participation in 
biomedical research in general as a moral obligation; it is a possible argument for a 
particular research study under certain conditions being a moral obligation. And even the 
more modest argument can still be considered controversial. What (if anything) does consent 
mean if individuals are morally obliged to participate in a research study because their 
impoverished community has been promised important side benefits?
Second, one could argue that viewing research participation as morally obligatory could 
have positive consequences from the standpoint of social justice. Currently, participants in 
health-related research tend to come disproportionately from socially underprivileged 
groups: those with poor health indicators and those for whom health-related research may be 
most attractive, such as poor populations at risk for infectious diseases and without access to 
basic health care. Making research morally obligatory for all social groups might alleviate 
the injustice of the socially disadvantaged groups bearing the greater burden of research 
participation by more equitably spreading the burden.23 However, those with greater social, 
economic, and political power could evade such obligations with little cost to themselves. 
The situation is analogous to military service: to have proportional numbers of recruits from 
all social classes, something stronger than appeals to moral conscience would be necessary. 
A more equitable spreading of the burden would probably require research participation to 
be legally compulsory—like a policy of military conscription—and not just morally 
obligatory. (Research participants would then be analogous to citizen-soldiers engaged in a 
war against poor health.) Even those who strongly believe research participation should be 
regarded as morally obligatory tend to recoil from this extreme position.
Should the Paradigm Shift?
Given the issues raised in the foregoing sections, many questions require answers. Why 
should we change? What was so wrong about the traditional view that such a massive 
alteration is required? Is it just to increase the number of participants? Are we incapable of 
doing that by other means? Why is there this push to increase the number of research 
participants anyway? Are we supposed to believe that because health-related research has 
produced significant benefits in the past, we are morally committed to maximally increasing 
research participation ad infinitum?
To discredit the idea of research participation as obligatory, Hans Jonas famously tried to 
debunk the importance of health-related research as a whole. He provocatively claimed that 
society could survive and even flourish if no research on cancer and heart disease was 
conducted at all and people continued to die of these conditions at the current rate of 
incidence.24 Those wary of regarding research participation as obligatory do not have to go 
this far. One can affirm that some health-related research is important—even very important
—without implying a change in the overall moral status of research participation. One might 
even argue that, in specific studies with certain conditions, a solid case could be made that 
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certain participants are morally obligated to join. Alternatively, research participation could 
be regarded as an imperfect duty—in other words, a duty in suitable circumstances to give 
reasonable consideration to participating in research during the process of weighing different 
possible options for action.25 (Having an imperfect duty to participate in research is 
compatible with blamelessly choosing to do something else.) Research participation would 
be one important imperfect duty among many that individuals have, along with imperfect 
duties to donate money to reputable charities, for example, or to use one’s expertise to help 
the disadvantaged. These theoretical possibilities are worth further exploration, but the point 
here is the contrast with the more robust, general conception of research as a moral 
obligation: to defend the latter, you need a more inflated conception of the importance of 
health-related research than reality can bear.
The moral status of research participation cannot be separated from its history. Nazi 
experimentation and abuses, at least in part, consolidated the view that participation in 
research should not be obligatory in order to protect research participants from exploitation 
by more powerful stakeholders. Nor can the moral status of research participation be 
separated from possible underlying motivations. In whose interest is a change of status from 
nonobligatory to obligatory? Who ultimately stands to gain the most from it, and who has 
the most to lose? Health research has become a vast international industry, and changing the 
moral status of research participation serves the political and economic interests of its 
biggest players. It is probably no accident that calls to change the moral status of research 
participation come at a time when health research is increasingly being outsourced and off-
shored around the world: relocating research in lower-income countries and framing 
research participation as a robust duty are mutually reinforcing ways of enhancing power 
and profitability. So at least in the short term, the chief beneficiaries of calling research 
participation “obligatory” are researchers, research institutions, public and private research 
funding agencies, and pharmaceutical companies. Those who believe that all of us, globally, 
will benefit—and benefit equitably—from this radical change have an unusually profound if 
not misguided faith in these institutions.
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